Prevent encryption operations to use swap files about cardano-crypto HOT 3 OPEN

What you're asking to do here is not currently doable with the haskell memory model (as used), and 'raw-memory-dump' is actually not part of the threat model (since the passphrases are in clear pretty much all over memory). The only non invasive way right now to solve this problem is to use hardware key; all the counter measure above would just be snake oil without a complete re-architecturing of the secret managements.

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We will review with the product managers if we want to address this, and if so with what priority.

This will be more relevant with KES since although we may start with the encrypted KES_0 and passphrase, we will need to keep in memory (at different times) KES_1..KES_n, and not leak these to disk, so an ability to use mlock'ed memory for the private keys could be important.

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This repository doesn't implement KES, and is not tracking meta tasks either. so I fail to see the point to track this here, considering this is about redefining the threat model of the application.

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