Implied security risks about vpn-slice HOT 2 CLOSED

Awesome! Thank you very much for the explanations! And for the script too!!

from vpn-slice.

It's a good question.

Can my network admin (who provides the VPN) identify that I have exposed the private network ?

No. From the VPN administrator's perspective, there is no sign that you have configured your routing on the client side differently from the default. Lots of VPN client software spies on your computer and reveals details of client-side routing and security configuration (!!!), but openconnect does not do this unless you really insist on it and use a wrapper script to protect your system.

Perhaps the VPN administrator will see that you are only ever connecting to 2-3 internal IP addresses, whatever you've whitelisted with vpn-slice, but… so what? Maybe it's your personal practice not to use the Internet when your access is going through the corporate VPN. Lots of people I know do that.

I was wondering if you could explain what risks, if any, I am taking by using vpn-slice.

By giving you more control over the routing config, vpn-slice certainly makes it possible for you to evade or subvert the firewalls around a corporate network, which is probably why few corporate VPNs offer split tunneling by default.

1. You could connect to multiple VPNs and bridge them. Let's say you are a contractor who has access to both Apple's VPN and Samsung's VPN, and you connect to both simultaneously and configure the routing badly… they will probably not be thrilled to see packets from each others' internal networks 😛
2. If you have a virus or other malware on your computer, it could steal data from the corporate network and then pass it to a server on the public internet, without the corporate firewalls having a chance to intercept its outgoing traffic.

from vpn-slice.