ADTGenerator is a command-line tool that generates attack--defense trees (ADTrees) based on an ontological knowledge base which can be imported into ADTool. The imported ADTrees can then be used for threat modeling and risk assessment activities.
The knowledge base is composed of two ontologies, viz., DFD (src/main/resources/DFD.owl) and ADT (src/main/resources/ADT.owl). The DFD ontology can be used to model the target of inspection as a data flow diagram (DFD), whereas the ADT ontology models (generic) threat trees, which are based on (Shostack, 2014), and specific threat scenarios.
Currently, ADTGenerator supports the generation of plain STRIDE threat trees that put a specific asset at risk and multi-stage sabotage ADTrees.
Information disclosure (threat type) ADTree that targets the source code (asset):
java -jar adtgenerator.jar --stride --threattype I --asset "Source Code"
Sabotage ADTree with the goal Inject Malicious Code Into Source Code:
java -jar adtgenerator.jar --sabotage --goal "Inject Malicious Code Into Source Code"
SPARQL query to retrieve the processes, external entities or data stores that transfer data to the test management tool:
PREFIX ns: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/DFD#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
SELECT ?sender ?flow
WHERE {
?tmg rdf:type ?tmgType.
?tmgType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:Process.
?tmg rdfs:label "Test Management Tool"@en.
?flow rdf:type ?flowType.
?flowType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:DataFlow.
{
?ee rdf:type ?eeType.
?eeType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:ExternalEntity.
?flow ns:flows ?ee.
BIND (?ee as ?sender)
}
UNION
{
?pr rdf:type ?prType.
?prType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:Process.
?flow ns:flows ?pr.
BIND (?pr as ?sender)
}
UNION
{
?ds rdf:type ?dsType.
?dsType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:DataStore.
?flow ns:flows ?ds.
BIND (?ds as ?sender)
}.
?flow ns:flows ?tmg.
FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?sender rdfs:label "Test Management Tool"@en }
}
SPARQL query to determine the attack targets for compromising test results:
PREFIX ns: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/DFD#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
SELECT ?individual ?id
WHERE {
?asset rdf:type ?assetType.
?assetType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:Asset.
?asset ns:usedBy ?individual.
?individual ns:id ?id.
?asset rdfs:label "Test Results"@en.
}
SPARQL query to retrieve the roles that are accessing test results:
PREFIX ns: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/DFD#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
SELECT ?ee
WHERE {
?ee rdf:type ?eeType.
?eeType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:ExternalEntity.
?asset rdf:type ?assetType.
?assetType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:Asset.
?asset rdfs:label "Test Results"@en.
?flow rdf:type ?flowType.
?flowType rdfs:subClassOf* ns:DataFlow.
?flow ns:flows ?ee.
{
?asset ns:usedBy ?flow
}
UNION
{
?flow ns:flows ?asset
}
}
SPARQL query to retrieve the STRIDE threats that put the test data at risk:
PREFIX dfd: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/DFD#>
PREFIX adt: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/ADT#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
SELECT ?threatType
WHERE {
?asset rdf:type ?assetType.
?assetType rdfs:subClassOf* dfd:Asset.
?asset rdfs:label "Test Data"@en.
?asset dfd:usedBy ?individual.
?individual dfd:id ?id.
?individual rdf:type ?individualType.
?individualType rdfs:label ?individualTypeLabel.
?goal rdf:type ?goalType.
?goalType rdfs:subClassOf* adt:Goal.
?goal adt:hasTarget ?targetType.
?targetType rdfs:label ?targetTypeLabel.
?goal adt:hasType ?threatType.
FILTER(?individualTypeLabel = ?targetTypeLabel)
}
GROUP BY ?threatType
SPARQL query to identify the most cost-effective countermeasures:
PREFIX dfd: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/DFD#>
PREFIX adt: <http://www.semanticweb.org/adtgenerator/ontologies/2018/10/ADT#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
SELECT ?countermeasure ?pCountermeasure ?cost ?attack ?pAttack
WHERE {
?attack rdf:type ?attackType.
?attackType rdfs:subClassOf* adt:AttackNode.
?attack adt:connectedTo ?connector.
?attack adt:successProbability ?pAttack.
?countermeasure rdf:type ?countermeasureType.
?countermeasureType rdfs:subClassOf* adt:DefenseNode.
?connector adt:connectedTo ?countermeasure.
?countermeasure adt:cost ?cost.
?countermeasure adt:successProbability ?pCountermeasure
}
ORDER BY DESC(?pAttack) ?pCountermeasure ?cost
If you use ADTGenerator in your research, please consider citing our Computers & Security (85) publication. Feel free to use the paper's BibTeX entry.
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